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REWORKING THE UNWORKABLE: 
HALLIBURTON II AND THE 
COURT’S REEXAMINATION OF 
FRAUD ON THE MARKET  
MARIANA ESTÉVEZ* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2002, the Erica P. John Fund, Inc., brought a 
securities fraud class action against Halliburton Company and its 
President, David Lesar.1 The case reached the Supreme Court for the 
first time in 2011 on the issue of class certification2 and was vacated 
and remanded for further proceedings.3 Now, nearly twelve years after 
its initiation, the case returns to the Supreme Court’s docket as 
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.4 (Halliburton II) for yet 
another examination of issues related to class certification. This time, 
however, the Court’s disposition could signify “the possible death of a 
cause of action that has been the centerpiece of private securities 
litigation for the last forty years.”5 
Twenty-six years ago,6 in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,7 the Supreme 
 
*J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, class of 2015. I would like to thank 
Professor Elisabeth de Fontenay, Todd Noelle, and Adam Fine for their thoughtful guidance 
and conscientious editing. 
 1.  Moore v. Halliburton Co., No 3:02-CV-1152-M, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18187, at *9 
(N.D. Tex., Sept. 9, 2004), vacated sub nom. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. 131 S. 
Ct. 2179 (2011).   
 2.  Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011) (“Whether 
securities fraud plaintiffs must prove loss causation in order to obtain class certification.”). 
 3.  Id. at 2187. 
 4.  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. argued Mar. 5, 2014). 
 5.  Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-Market?: Reflections on 
Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, Georgetown Pub. Law and Legal Theory 
Research Paper No. 13-058, Nov. 16, 2013, at 2 (hereinafter Judgment Day).  
 6.  Halliburton was argued before the Supreme Court on March 5, 2014, almost twenty-six 
years to the day after the Basic opinion, which adopted the fraud on the market rule, was 
handed down on March 7, 1988. 
 7.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). Only three justices joined Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion in Basic; however, because only six justices heard the case, the four-justice 
opinion constitutes a majority opinion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (“The Supreme Court of the United 
ESTEVEZ COMMENTARY 06 15 14 V FINAL READ - TODD (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2014  10:52 AM 
222 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 9 
Court adopted “the fraud on the market” rule. This rule presumes that 
investors who traded in an efficient market relied on all public 
material information about a company when they purchased its stock. 
This presumption saves plaintiffs the trouble of proving that they 
were individually aware of any particular misstatement, and in the 
case of class actions, opens the door for them to bring suit. 
The fraud on the market rule finds its foundation in the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis — the theory that efficient markets 
incorporate all material public information into market price.8 This 
theory does not discriminate between accurate and misstated 
information disclosed by company trading in an efficient market. 
Thus, even misstatements, if material and publicly disclosed, are 
presumed to be incorporated into an efficient market’s stock prices. 
All investors who traded in an efficient market can be presumed to 
have relied on all material information, including misstated 
information.9 
Halliburton and Lesar, Petitioners in Halliburton II, urge the 
Court to revisit the questionable economic foundation of the fraud on 
the market rule, and thus overrule Basic to the extent that it 
recognizes this presumption of classwide reliance.10 Eliminating this 
presumption would arguably require individualized proof of reliance 
at class certification, all but preventing plaintiffs from proceeding 
under the class action mechanism.11 Despite the potential implications 
 
States shall consist of a Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, any six of 
whom shall constitute a quorum.”). 
 8.  Id. at 242. 
 9.  Id. at 247. 
 10.  Brief of Petitioners at 3, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. 
Dec. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Merits Brief of Petitioner]. 
 11.  See Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1209 (2013) 
(“Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption is highly significant because it makes securities-
fraud class actions possible by converting the inherently individual reliance inquiry into a 
question common to the class, which is necessary to satisfy the dictates of [Federal] Rule [of 
Civil Procedure] 23(b)(3).”) (Thomas, J., concurring). Scholars suggest that plaintiffs could 
nevertheless bring securities class actions under Affiliated Ute v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 
(1972), which allows a presumption of reliance in cases alleging material omissions rather than 
misstatements as the basis of fraud, but the viability of this alternative remains hotly debated. 
See Ann Lipton, A reasonable facsimile thereof, L. PROFESSORS BLOGS NETWORK (Feb. 15, 
2014) http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/02/a-reasonable-facsimile-
thereof.html (“I don’t see how much of a role [Affiliated Ute] can play with respect to 
substituting for Basic.”). See also Claire Loebs Davis, Halliburton: Is the Fix as Basic as Alleging 
Omissions under Affiliated Ute? Or is That Too Cute?, D&O DISCOURSE (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://www.dandodiscourse.com/2014/01/28/halliburton-is-the-fix-as-basic-as-alleging-omissions-
under-affiliated-ute-or-is-that-too-cute/ (“Affiliated Ute does not offer a quick fix to the 
potential elimination of Basic’s fraud-on-the market presumption.”). See also,  
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of such a holding, some members of the Court are eager to revisit 
Basic’s controversial holding.12 
Parts II and III of this commentary introduce Halliburton II’s 
factual and legal background, respectively. Part IV outlines the 
arguments of Petitioners and Respondents, and Part V builds on these 
arguments and recommends that the Court overrule Basic. Finally, 
Part V reframes the disagreement between the majority and dissent in 
Basic and predicts, through that lens, that the Court in Halliburton II 
will not overrule Basic, but will likely modify Basic's presumption to 
require plaintiffs to prove that the alleged misstatement or omission 
actually affected market price in order to earn the benefit of the 
presumption. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In this case, Respondents allege that Halliburton used falsified 
financial statements to mislead the public about “(1) its liability for 
asbestos claims, (2) its probability of collecting revenue on 
unapproved claims on fixed-price construction contracts; and (3) the 
benefits of its merger with Dresser Industries.”13 According to the 
complaint, defendants understated their exposure to asbestos liability, 
downplaying the potential adverse impact of pending judgments.14 
They included in its revenues $98 million worth of unapproved and 
likely unrecoverable claims.15 
Most significantly, on December 7, 2001, Halliburton’s stock price 
decreased by 42% following the announcement of a $30 million 
verdict from asbestos claims against the company.16 Several market 
analysts reported the price drop as the market’s reaction to the news: 
 
 12.  See, e.g., id. at 1204 (“[M]ore recent evidence suggests that the presumption may rest 
on a faulty economic premise . . . In light of this development, reconsideration of the Basic 
presumption may be appropriate.”) (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1206 (“Today’s holding does 
not merely accept what some consider the regrettable consequences of the four-Justice opinion 
in Basic; it expands those consequences from the arguably regrettable to the unquestionably 
disastrous.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1209 n.4 (“The Basic decision itself is questionable . . . 
but the court has not been asked to revisit Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption. I thus limit 
my dissent to demonstrating that the Court is not following Basic’s dictates.”) (Thomas, J. 
dissenting). 
 13.  Brief of Respondents in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at 9, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 
No. 13-317 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Cert. Brief of Respondents]. 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id. at 11. 
 16.  Id. at 10. 
ESTEVEZ COMMENTARY 06 15 14 V FINAL READ - TODD (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2014  10:52 AM 
224 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 9 
a manifestation of investors’ loss of faith in the company.17 
Nevertheless, analysts disagree about the proportionality of the 
market’s response.18 While some suggested the 42% drop might have 
been an overreaction, others withheld judgment.19 
 
That day Moody’s, one of the nationally recognized credit rating 
agencies, downgraded Halliburton’s credit rating.20 It is unclear 
whether the downgrade independently affected Halliburton’s stock 
price or whether it simply reflected the asbestos verdicts.21 However, 
as an independent event that could have contributed to the price 
decrease, the downgrade casts doubt on any event studies seeking to 
determine the actual impact the asbestos judgments might have had 
on Halliburton’s stock price.22 
Halliburton stock, which trades on the New York Stock Exchange, 
is closely monitored and has 848 million shares outstanding.23 
Additionally, a regression analysis of thirty-one instances of 
Halliburton-specific stock movement suggested that the stock price 
“as a general matter react[s] promptly to unexpected news.”24 Large 
fluctuations in Halliburton’s stock price, therefore, can be associated 
as a general rule with material, unexpected information.25 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange 
 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. at app. 23a While both parties refer to the event as a “downgrade,” it is unclear 
whether the downgrade was actually referring to a change in Halliburton’s credit, or simply a 
projection reflecting the likelihood that the rating would remain unchanged. The change 
actually took place in the “rating outlook,” which changed from “stable” to “negative.” Id. at 
25a–26a.  
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 11. 
 21.  Id. at app. 25a. 
 22.  See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 
52 CHI. L. REV. 611, 627–28 (1985) (identifying intervening causes as complicating factors that 
render less reliable the event studies used to determine impact of firm-specific news on stock 
pice).  
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 2. 
 25.  Id. It is undisputed that plaintiffs may not invoke fraud on the market where the stock 
did not trade on an efficient market, so plaintiffs allege with that this specific stock traded on an 
efficient market before they can resort to fraud on the market. 
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Act)26 to protect investors from unsavory practices by securities 
issuers27 largely as a response to the Great Depression and stock 
market crash of 1929.28 The Exchange Act established the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate the capital markets and 
address excessive speculation, unfair practices, and inadequate 
disclosure in the markets after the initial offering of securities.29 
 
 
More specifically, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits the 
use of “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and 
Exchange] Commission may prescribe” and “in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.”30 Pursuant to this authority, the SEC 
promulgated Rule 10b-5, which proscribes the use of the mail, a 
national security exchange, or any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce to manipulate or deceive investors in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security.31 In essence, Rule 10b-5 makes 
any securities fraud actionable, within the full jurisdictional breadth of 
the Commerce Clause. 
B. The Supreme Court’s § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence 
Despite the fact that neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 
explicitly establishes a private cause of action, courts have long 
inferred a civil claim and remedy for securities fraud based on Section 
10 and Rule 10b-5.32 In Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & 
Casualty Co.,33 the Supreme Court recognized this claim for the first 
time, but relegated its only affirmative statement adopting the private 
cause of action to a single footnote.34 Despite this recognition, the 
Court subsequently restricted the claim by mandating standing 
requirements in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores35 and 
 
 26.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C.A § 78app (West 2013)). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  H. R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 3 (1934). 
 29.  S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 5 (1934). 
 30.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.A. §78j (West 2014). 
 31.  Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
 32.  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).  
 33.  404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
 34.  Id. at 14 n.9 (“It is now established that a private right of action is implied under § 
10(b).”). 
 35.  421 U.S. 723, 731 (1975) (limiting the right action to actual purchasers and sellers of 
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imposing a scienter requirement in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.36 
With time, the elements of the cause of action have crystalized into 
(1) a material misrepresentation, (2) scienter, (3) a connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance (or transaction 
causation), (5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation.37 
Properly understood, the fourth and sixth elements of the cause of 
action require the plaintiff to establish two different types of 
causation. First, “transaction causation,” also known as “reliance,” 
addresses the relationship between a misrepresentation and the 
plaintiff’s decision to invest in the company.38 Second, “loss causation” 
refers to “a causal connection between the material misrepresentation 
and the loss,”39 and is considered commensurate with proximate cause. 
Transaction causation requires plaintiffs to prove that they relied 
on a material misstatement or omission when they engaged in the 
transaction that caused their loss.40 In other words, they must prove 
that but for the material misstatement or omission, they would not 
have engaged in the transaction that caused their loss.41 This 
requirement makes it impossible for securities fraud suits to be 
brought as class actions because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
conditions class certification on proof that “questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual members.”42 Reliance turns on factual information 
specific to each class member, causing questions that affect individual 
members to predominate over common factual issues. 43 
In the 1988 case of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Court departed from 
the cautious approach that yielded the scienter and standing 
requirements in Blue Chip Stamp and Ernst, and endorsed the “fraud 
on the market rule.”44 The rule, which had been applied in lower 
 
securities). 
 36.  425 U.S. at 193 (declining to recognize a right of action for aiding and abetting under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 where the defendant lacked intent to defraud). 
 37.  Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341•42 (2005). 
 38.  Id. at 341•42. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  James Cox, Understanding Causation in Private Securities Lawsuits: Building on 
Amgen, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1719, 1739•40 (2013). 
 41.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 245 (suggesting that without fraud on the market, a plaintiff would 
have to prove “how he would have acted if omitted material information had been disclosed or 
if the misrepresentation had not been made.”). 
 42.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 43.  Amgen Inc. v. Conn.Et. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2013). 
 44.  Basic, Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249–50 (1988). 
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courts but never before recognized by the Supreme Court, permits 
trial courts to accept a rebuttable presumption of classwide reliance if 
plaintiffs can demonstrate that the stock at issue trades in an efficient 
market.45 
The adoption of the fraud on the market rule benefitted plaintiffs 
in two ways. First, it relieved them of the “unrealistic evidentiary 
burden”46 of proving how they would have acted had there not been a 
misstatement or omission. Second, this rule made securities fraud 
suits practicable by making the class action mechanism available to 
securities fraud plaintiffs.47 This proved crucial to the practicability of 
securities fraud suits because “most claimants’ losses are not large 
enough to justify the expense of their individual prosecution.”48 In 
these two ways, Basic greatly liberalized access to the 10b-5 claim,49 
which generated a dramatic increase in litigation50 and induced 
Congress to enact the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (PSLRA).51 The PLSRA instituted heightened procedural, audit, 
and disclosure requirements to decrease abusive litigation, reduce 
coercive settlements, and better detect fraud.52 
Applying the PLSRA, the Supreme Court held in Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo53 that plaintiffs must “adequately 
allege and prove” loss causation to prevail in a private securities class 
action.54 Under Dura, it is insufficient for plaintiffs to show that a 
material misrepresentation inflated market price because the mere 
distortion of market price at the date of purchase does not prove that 
the misrepresentation was the proximate cause of an economic loss.55 
More recently yet, private securities litigation has focused on the 
interaction among the class certification requirements under the 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,56 the fraud on the market 
 
 45.  Id. at 248 (1988). 
 46.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 245. 
 47.  Cox, supra note 40 at 1721. 
 48.  Cox, supra note 40 at 1721. 
 49.  Id. at 261 (admonishing that the Court is making the claim available to too broad a set 
of plaintiffs) (White, J., dissenting). 
 50.  Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 151, 179 (2009) [hereinafter Basic at Twenty].  
 51.  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 18 U.S.C.). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 54.  Id. at 346. 
 55.  Id. at 342. 
 56.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
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presumption, and the remaining elements of a Section 10(b) claim. 
This focus has been driven by the question of whether the remaining 
elements of the claim pose obstacles to class certification. The first 
time this case reached the Supreme Court in Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 
v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I) the Court held that plaintiffs can be 
certified as a class without proving that the defendant’s 
misrepresentation actually caused economic loss because the actual 
cause of the loss “has nothing to do with whether an investor relied 
on the misrepresentation.”57 
Further, in Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust 
Funds,58 the Court also allowed a class to be certified without proof 
that the alleged misstatements were material.59 In that case, the Court 
reasoned that materiality is an objective inquiry that can be 
established through evidence common to the class.60 In other words, 
failure to prove that a misstatement is material does not cause 
individual issues to predominate; it destroys the 10b-5 claim for all 
plaintiffs.61 This inquiry, then, is entirely unlike the reliance inquiry. 
Under the reliance inquiry, the class’s failure to attain the fraud on 
the market presumption does not end the case. With materiality, 
however, failure to earn the presumption defeats class certification 
automatically.62 
Amgen reveals the gravity of the tension between Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 and the fraud on the market rule. Although the 
Court ultimately held that materiality was a merits issue not 
appropriate for the class certification stage, three Justices dissented, 
arguing materiality is necessary to earn the presumption of reliance in 
fraud on the market cases.63 Where plaintiffs fail to show that a 
misrepresentation was material and therefore that it was incorporated 
into market price under the efficient capital markets hypothesis, fraud 
on the market fails.  Thus, common issues do not predominate and the 
class cannot be certified.64 In all likelihood, such claims would be 
 
 57.  Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011). This differs from 
the holding in Dura where the Court was not concerned with class certification but with success 
on the merits. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005). 
 58.  133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
 59.  Id. at 1191. 
 60.  Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1195. 
 61.  Id. at 1196. 
 62.  Id. at 1199. 
 63.  Id. at 1209 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 64.  Id. at 1209–10 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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“dead on arrival.”65 
Halliburton II picks up where Amgen left off. In Halliburton II, 
the Court will decide: (1) whether to overrule or modify Basic’s 
presumption of reliance based on the fraud on the market theory; and 
(2) whether the defendant may rebut the presumption of reliance in a 
fraud on the market case at the class certification stage by introducing 
evidence to disprove the allegation that an alleged misrepresentation 
distorted the market price of the stock. 
IV. ARGUMENTS 
B. Petitioners’ Arguments 
Petitioners contend that the efficient capital markets hypothesis, 
the foundation for Basic’s presumption of reliance, is empirically 
invalid. Therefore, they urge, the Court should take one of three 
paths: (1) overrule the presumption;66 (2) modify it to turn on price 
impact rather than market efficiency;67 or, at the very least, (3) allow 
Petitioners to rebut it at the class certification stage by presenting 
evidence disproving price impact.68 
 
Petitioners begin by identifying and debunking the two premises 
of the efficient capital markets hypothesis: (1) that efficient markets 
incorporate all public material misrepresentations into market price 
and (2) that investors rely on the integrity of this price when they 
trade on the market.69 
Petitioners cite empirical evidence suggesting that capital markets 
do not incorporate all types of public material information at equal 
speeds or with any degree of rationality.70 To begin with, investors’ 
attempts to “beat the market” cause price to fluctuate irrationally, 
severing the link between material information and market price.71 
Additionally, practices such as “noise trading” and computerized 
trading,72 which by definition rely on bases other than information 
 
 65.  Id. at 1211 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 66.  Merits Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 35. 
 67.  Id. at 37. 
 68.  Id. at 49. 
 69.  Id. at 10. 
 70.  See id. at 17 (illustrating that market prices respond differently to the disclosure of the 
same piece of information depending on the method of disclosure).  
 71.  Id. at 19. 
 72.  “[Noise trading refers to] trad[ing] on things other than material information about the 
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about the issuer, also contribute to this irrationality. 
Moreover, Petitioners argue, to the extent market efficiency is 
present, it exists not as a binary condition but on a spectrum.73 
Markets operate efficiently some of the time with respect to some 
types of information; therefore, courts are misguided in presuming 
reliance on all public material misrepresentations.74 Such a 
presumption is necessarily both over- and under-inclusive because the 
general efficiency of a market does not bear directly on whether a 
particular misrepresentation affected market price.75 As an example, 
Petitioners cited the publication of a high profile New York Times 
article detailing a company’s progress in cancer research.  Following 
this publication  stock price increased from $12 per share to $52 per 
share despite the fact that the very same information had been 
published five months earlier in a scientific magazine as well as in a 
lower profile article in the New York Times.76 If the market had fully 
incorporated the information when it was first published, it would not 
have responded to its republication, no matter how prominent. 
Accordingly, the sole fact that a market is efficient does not 
guarantee that it responds to all material public information. A 
market's efficiency does not automatically bear on whether a 
particular investor relied on the market price.77 An investor does not 
indirectly rely on the information by relying on the market price. To 
Petitioners, the very fact that investors employ a variety of tactics to 
“beat the market” and take advantage of its inefficiencies suggests 
that the second premise of the efficient capital markets hypothesis 
cannot be absolute.78 While some investors may trade in reliance on 
 
company . . . . [Computerized trading] us[es] complex algorithms that aim to beat the market, 
executing trades based on predetermined metrics, not rationally assimilating public disclosures.” 
Id. at 19–20.  
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 20–21. 
 75.  Id. The Petitioners elaborate on this problem with market efficiency: 
If a market for a given stock is generally inefficient or undeveloped, defendants who 
made affirmative misrepresentations may escape certification and liability, even if the 
misrepresentation unquestionably distorted the stock’s price. . . . Yet, . . . if a stock 
trades on a market that is generally efficient or well-developed, that says little about 
whether it was efficient with respect to a particular misrepresentation and whether the 
market in fact reacted to the information.  
Id. at 21. 
 76.  Id. at 17. For a detailed description of instances of over- and under-inclusiveness see 
Lucian A. Bebchuck & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS. L. (forthcoming May 2014) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2371304.  
 77.  Merits Brief of Petitioner, supra note 10, at 17. 
 78.  Id. at 16. 
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market price, others decidedly do not, and that fact alone renders 
Basic’s foundation a fiction.79 
Petitioners argue in the alternative that if the Court is unwilling to 
overrule the presumption altogether, it should at least modify it to 
require plaintiffs to show that the misrepresentation actually distorted 
market price.80 This modification would accord not only with modern 
financial economic theory as described above,81 but also with Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s requirement that plaintiffs prove 
common issues predominate over issues specific to individual class 
members.82 
Were the Court to preserve the presumption as formulated in 
Basic, Petitioners maintain it should nevertheless allow defendants to 
rebut the presumption at the class certification stage by presenting 
evidence that the misrepresentations did not affect market price.83 
This is consistent with Amgen’s holding that certain elements of a 
10b-5, such as materiality, are not relevant to class certification and 
should not be addressed at that stage.84 Where plaintiffs cannot prove 
that the misrepresentation actually distorted market price, they can 
nevertheless sustain a claim for fraud by presenting direct evidence of 
reliance.85 Successful rebuttal of price distortion, therefore, does not 
immediately defeat a plaintiff’s claim but does cause individual issues 
to predominate over issues common to a class, making the inquiry 
directly relevant to class certification.86 
Petitioners advance a variety of policy arguments in support of 
overruling Basic’s presumption. Echoing Justice White’s dissent in 
Basic, Petitioners emphasize the difficulties courts face performing 
the complex and imprecise analysis necessary to establish market 
 
 79.  See id. (“[S]ome investors rely on market integrity and others do not.”) (quoting 
Jonathan R. Macey, The Fraud on the Market Theory: Some Preliminary Issues, 74 CORNELL L. 
REV. 923, 926 (1989)). 
 80.  Id. at 37 (citing Halliburton I and Amgen for the proposition that investor reliance is 
necessarily premised on a misrepresentation’s actually having distorted market price). 
 81.  Id. at 38–39; see supra, notes 70–75 and accompanying text. 
 82.  Id. at 39. 
 83.  Id. at 49; see also Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 
10–11, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2013) [hereinafter 
Brief of Law Professors]. 
 84.  Id. at 49–50.  
 85.  See id. at 52 (“[W]here the defendant directly shows that he misrepresentations did not 
distort the market price[,] plaintiffs can still establish personal reliance and loss caution in non-
fraud-on-the-market cases where misstatements were nonpublic or otherwise did not affect an 
exchange-traded price.”). 
 86.  Id. at 53. 
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efficiency.87 They also raise concerns about the increased likelihood of 
in terrorem or “blackmail” settlements in Rule 10b-5 litigation:88 the 
fear that the cost of litigation after a class has been certified will be so 
high that it might coerce defendants to settle even where plaintiffs’ 
claims are weak. They further cite the failure of class actions both to 
compensate investors89 and to deter fraudulent misrepresentations90 as 
compelling reasons to abandon the presumption. Finally, they note, 
the fact that Congress neither directly created, nor explicitly adopted 
a private cause of action for securities fraud leaves to the Court the 
responsibility to amend or overrule the doctrine.91 
B. Respondents’ Arguments 
Respondents track their counterparts’ arguments closely. They 
begin by defending Basic as correctly decided and addressing policy 
concerns associated with eliminating the presumption. Next, they 
maintain that the shortcomings of the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis does not warrant overruling Basic. Finally, they argue that 
the Court should not modify the presumption to turn on price impact 
because doing so would contravene recent precedent.92 
Basic’s adoption of the fraud on the market rule came at a time 
when the efficient market hypothesis enjoyed widespread 
acceptance.93 This principle, therefore, informed both the structure of 
securities legislation and earlier attempts by the Court to execute 
Congress’s legislative intent.94 Therefore, Respondents continue, 
overruling Basic would have disastrous effects not only for private 
securities suits,95 but also for public enforcement of securities laws.96 
First, securities regulation envisions a system of disclosure premised 
on the idea that information need not be released into the market 
more than once for the market to respond to it.97 This regulatory 
 
 87.  Id. at 22. 
 88.  Id. at 41 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 44. 
 91.  Id. at 32. 
 92.  See, e.g., Amgen v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013) 
(reasoning that materiality could be proved by evidence common to the class). 
 93.  Brief of Respondents at 21, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 
(U.S. Dec. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Merits Brief of Respondents]. 
 94.  Id. at 23. 
 95.  Id. at 24. 
 96.  Id. at 28.  
 97.  Id. at 27. 
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scheme arises from the efficient capital markets hypothesis, and 
questioning this premise weakens the foundations of the entire 
system.98 
Second, event studies, which also rely on an assumption of market 
responsiveness to information, form the crux of securities fraud 
prosecutions and other enforcement actions.99 Similarly here, 
questioning the economic theory underlying these event studies 
would jeopardize the viability of public securities enforcement as a 
response to securities fraud.100 In short, Respondents do not argue 
that the efficient capital markets hypothesis is the most adequate 
premise upon which to base an entire scheme of securities law and 
securities enforcement procedures. They argue that the securities law 
and enforcement regime rely so heavily on the theory that calling it 
into question would deliver a blow to the legitimacy of the system as a 
whole. 
Furthermore, Respondents contend that the market inefficiencies 
Petitioners point to do not cast doubt on Basic’s foundational 
principle that “individual security prices incorporate information in a 
reasonably prompt way.”101 Basic did not rely on the binary 
conception of efficiency that Petitioners assign to it. It simply stated 
the broadly accepted claim that “developed markets generally 
respond to material information.”102 
Moreover, Respondents argue the Court should decline 
Petitioner’s to modify Basic's presumption to make it turn on price 
distortion rather than market efficiency. Doing so, Respondents 
contend would be contrary to the Court’s holdings in Amgen and 
Halliburton I.103 The question of price distortion is commensurate to 
the question of materiality addressed in Amgen, which the court held 
could not be adjudicated at the class certification stage.104 Amgen’s 
rationale for keeping materiality outside of the class certification 
stage applies equally to price distortion because both involve 
 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 28. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 35; see also, Brief of Financial Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 9, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. Feb. 5, 2014) 
[hereinafter Brief of Financial Economists]. 
 102.  Merits Brief of Respondents, supra note 93 at 38. Petitioner’s arguments do not 
distinguish between fundamental efficiency and informational efficiency, only the latter of which 
is necessary for fraud on the market to stand. Id. at 34 n.17. 
 103.  Id. at 50. 
 104.  Id. 
ESTEVEZ COMMENTARY 06 15 14 V FINAL READ - TODD (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2014  10:52 AM 
234 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 9 
objective inquiries that require common evidence. Where the inquiry 
fails, the claim as a whole cannot succeed.105 Additionally, as a 
practical matter, proving price impact often requires evidence that 
can only be obtained through merits discovery.106 
To conclude, Respondents argue in the alternative that if the 
Court decides to allow Petitioners to rebut price distortion at the class 
certification stage, Petitioners bear the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the misrepresentations did not 
distort the price of Halliburton stock.107 
V. ANALYSIS: THE TROUBLE WITH MODIFYING BASIC 
In Halliburton II, the Court will likely modify, but not 
overrule, Basic's holding—requiring that plaintiffs earn the rebuttable 
presumption of reliance by demonstrating that the misrepresentation 
actually distorted market price, rather than by merely demonstrating 
that the stock at issue traded in an efficient market. This solution 
purports to address the concerns of market efficiency skeptics while 
retaining the viability of class actions for section 10(b) plaintiffs, and it 
has consequently received a great deal of attention.108 Nevertheless, 
the modification does not ultimately resolve the shortcomings of 
Basic’s presumption. This section begins by discussing the 
fundamental problem with the Basic presumption and then illustrates 
how simply modifying the presumption does not sufficiently address 
that concern. 
A. Presumed Reliance is an Inadequate Response to Hardship of 
Proof. 
In his seminal paper, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the 
Market,109 Donald Langevoort reframes Basic’s inquiry into the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis so as to justify the presumption of 
reliance in the face of criticism and confusion.110 According to 
Langevoort, “the only persuasive, coherent interpretation of Basic’s 
presumption” is the reading that investors rely not on the accuracy of 
 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 55. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuck & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS. L.(forthcoming 
May 2014) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2371304; Brief of Law Professors, supra note 83 
at 28. 
 109.  See supra note 50. 
 110.  Id. at 151.  
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market price but on its integrity.111 In other words, investors do not 
assume that market price reflects the inherent value of a firm, but 
simply that it reflects material public information and that that 
information is not fraudulent.112 As Langevoort notes, however, the 
assumption that market price is not distorted by fraud is just as 
irrational as the assumption that market price reflects inherent 
value.113 
Nevertheless, Basic can stand if understood as granting investors 
an entitlement to rely on price integrity as a matter of policy rather 
than as a matter of sound economic judgment.114 Put differently, Basic 
can be understood as granting investors the right to believe that 
corporations are not manipulating information to distort market 
price. According to Langevoort, this right to rely on corporate 
statements parallels the right to rely on statements by strangers 
underlying common law fraud.115 Just as there is no reason to trust 
strangers, there is no reason to trust markets, but courts allow people 
to trust both strangers and markets by creating a cause of action for 
fraud.116 Langevoort calls this “an act of juristic grace.”117 
However, Langevoort does not address the difference between 
the right to rely on corporate statements and actual reliance on 
corporate statements. Someone who does not believe a stranger’s lies 
cannot be said to have acted on those lies and should not have 
recourse for fraud either in a face-to-face interaction or in connection 
with the purchase of a security.118 This highlights the fundamental 
problem with Basic reliance: it takes an undeserved right to rely on 
price integrity, which courts have granted to every investor, and 
 
 111.  Id. at 161. Langevoort notes that this reading may very well be at odds with the Court’s 
intention in Basic, but it is nevertheless the only convincing reading of their opinion. Id. 
 112.  Id. at 161. 
 113.  Id. at 160. 
 114.  See id. at 161 (“Whether or not it is what he was thinking, [Justice Blackmun’s policy-
making justification] really is the only persuasive, coherent interpretation of Basic’s 
presumption.”). 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 (1988) (noting plaintiffs who sold shares 
because of other concerns despite believing (1) Basic’s statements were false; (2) Basic was 
engaged in merger discussions, and (3) consequently that Basic stock was artificially 
underpriced, “could not be said to have relied on the integrity of a price he knew had been 
manipulated”); see also id. at 261 (“[I]t is possible that a person who heard the first corporate 
misstatement and disbelieved it . . . may still be included in the plaintiff-class on remand. How 
[such a person] can say that he was ‘defrauded’ by [relying] on the ’integrity’ of the market price 
is beyond me.”) (White, J. dissenting). 
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extrapolates from it the assumption that every investor did, in fact, 
rely on price integrity. Even a showing that a misrepresentation 
distorted market price does not guarantee that all members of a class 
actually relied on that price. 
 
In arguing that presumed reliance is an act of juristic grace 
comparable to the act of juristic grace that created common law fraud, 
Langevoort misapplies his own analogy. The act of juristic grace 
commensurate to the creation of the common law fraud doctrine 
occurred long before Basic when the Court first invented a private 
cause of action for securities fraud. 119 Presumed reliance, therefore, is 
not so much an act of juristic grace as the first of many attempts by 
the Court, and later Congress, to mend that tattered cloak it placed 
over the shivering shoulders of securities fraud plaintiffs back in 1971. 
While the presumption does make it significantly easier for 
plaintiffs to bring class action suits for securities fraud, it does more 
than simply recognize these plaintiffs’ right to trust the market in the 
way individuals may trust each other. Rather than merely granting 
investors a right to sue someone who has lied to them—as the 
common law would do—Basic’s presumption grants them the right to 
sue someone who has lied to a third party. 
B. A Presumption of Reliance Requires Impermissible Burden-Shifting 
and Procedural Complications. 
Nevertheless, Langevoort is correct in saying that the Basic Court 
made a policy decision in adopting the presumption of reliance. It 
chose to alleviate but not fully abolish plaintiffs’ burden of proof by 
allowing them to satisfy the reliance element through indirect 
evidence of market efficiency.120 In Justice Blackmun’s own words, 
“[r]equiring a plaintiff to show a speculative state of facts . . . would 
place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 
10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market.”121 The Court 
chose, therefore, to shift this “unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary 
burden”122 from the plaintiff, its rightful bearer, to the defendant, who 
 
 119.  Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 (1971) (recognizing a 
private cause of action for securities fraud based on § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).  
 120.  William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the 
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 73–74 (2011).  
 121.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 245. 
 122.  Id. 
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is even more ill-equipped to carry it. The irony of this decision does 
not appear to be entirely lost on Justice Blackmun, who went to great 
lengths to justify this choice. 
 
 
 
Presumptions, he wrote, “assist courts in managing circumstances 
in which direct proof for one reason or another is rendered 
difficult,”123 and they are “useful devices for allocating the burden of 
proof between parties.”124 Justice Blackmun cited McCormick on 
Evidence for the proposition that presumptions can be used to 
allocate the burden of proof.125 However, that very source also 
indicates that the considerations relevant to the initial assignment of 
the burden bear also upon the decision to shift it.126 A court should 
place the burden on the party who (1) has better access to a piece of 
information and who (2) alleges the more unlikely event.127 
Here, both considerations weigh against presuming reliance. First, 
the defendant in a securities fraud class action can proffer no 
evidence as to whether any class member was aware of or believed a 
misstatement. Because of the nature of the evidence required to 
prove reliance, demanding that the defendant disprove reliance 
requires them to produce evidence practically available only to the 
plaintiff. While proving actual reliance might be “unnecessarily 
unrealistic” for a group of plaintiffs acting as a class, the same 
requirement verges on the impossible when placed on the defendant. 
Second, although Justice Blackmun struggled to imagine an 
investor who does not rely on market integrity,128 Langevoort suggests 
that a reasonable investor maintains a healthy cynicism about the 
market price. 
Fraud and manipulation are predictable enough that it would be 
foolish for anyone simply to assume that a stock price has integrity. 
In an efficient market, the inevitable risk of fraud is priced and 
investors are compensated for taking on the risk—the market is 
 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id.  
 125.   Id. 
 126.  EDWARD W. CLEARLY, ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343 (3d ed. 1984). 
 127.  Id. at § 337. 
 128.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–47.  
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not assuming its absence.129 
In the absence of the presumption, the rational investor, aware 
that market price is likely distorted by fraud, might be more cautious 
or more diligent in conducting market research before accepting the 
“integrity” of market price. After all, the presumption allows an 
investor to sue, even if he never read or heard the alleged 
misstatement. 
 
 
 
Aware of the unsavory consequences of this burden-shifting, 
Justice Blackmun emphasized time and again the fact that the 
presumption of reliance is a rebuttable one, such that it does not 
destroy all defendants’ hopes of success.130 To be fair to Justice 
Blackmun’s formulation of the presumption, courts must allow 
defendants to present evidence to rebut the presumption and prevent 
the plaintiff from establishing it.131 However, the Court has held that 
hearing such evidence contravenes the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure because it forces merits issues, which belong in trial or at 
summary judgment, into the class certification stage.132 
Courts are therefore caught between a rock and a hard place, 
forced to circumvent the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if they wish 
to remain faithful to Basic. This tension was evident in Amgen133 and 
Halliburton I,134 and the Court’s solution was fundamentally 
unsatisfactory. In an attempt to avoid holding a quasi-trial at the class 
certification stage, the Court manipulated the class certification 
inquiry, effectively rendering the presumption unrebuttable, shifting 
the burdens of proof and persuasion entirely to the defendant, and 
doing violence both to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and to the 
holding in Basic.135 
 
 129.  Langevoort, supra note 50, at 160. 
 130.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 226, 229, 242, 245, 248, 248 n.28, 249, 250 (employing the term 
“rebuttable presumption” or otherwise addressing the fact that the defendant may rebut the 
presumption of reliance). 
 131.  Id. at 250. 
 132.  Amgen v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1204 (2013). 
 133.  Id. at 1194. 
 134.  Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2183 (2011) (“The question 
presented in this case is whether securities fraud plaintiffs must also prove loss causation [an 
affirmative element of the claim] in order to obtain class certification.”). 
 135.  Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1206 (“The Court today allows plaintiffs to obtain certification of 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In Basic, Justice Blackmun unequivocally abrogated all 
responsibility for the economic underpinnings of the fraud on the 
market rule. “Our task,” he wrote, “is not to assess the general validity 
of the theory, but to consider whether it was proper for the courts 
below to apply a rebuttable presumption of reliance, supported in 
part by the fraud-on-the-market theory.”136 This carefully crafted 
sentence holds the key to the Court’s opinion by juxtaposing the 
economic invalidity of the theory with the propriety of the 
presumption. To Justice Blackmun, the validity of the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis was not a necessary predicate for the presumption 
of reliance to be proper. In fact, the hypothesis need only be generally 
acceptable in order to buttress the presumption: “we need only 
believe that market professionals generally consider most publicly 
announced material statements about companies, thereby affecting 
stock market prices.”137 
Therein lies the fundamental disagreement between Justice 
Blackmun and Justice White. Justice Blackmun viewed the 
presumption as a matter of equity.138 He was concerned that the 
reliance requirement placed too heavy a burden on securities fraud 
plaintiffs, so he applied an equitable remedy to reallocate the 
burden.139 Beyond that, he engaged in a relatively cursory analysis of 
the hypothesis consistent with his assertion that it was not for the 
Court to examine. 
Justice White, on the other hand, viewed the issue primarily as a 
matter of law and embarked on a vehement attack on the fraud of the 
market rule. He questioned its economic foundation,140 its pedigree as 
judicially-created doctrine lacking affirmative Congressional 
 
securities-fraud class actions without proof that common questions predominate over 
individualized questions of reliance, . . . by all but eliminating materiality as one of the 
predicates of the fraud-on-the-market theory . . . .”) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 136.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 242. 
 137.  Id. at 247 n.24 (emphasis added). 
 138.  Thus characterized, Justice Blackmun’s view of the reliance presumption is consistent 
with his broader conception of the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 private cause of action articulated in 
his dissent in Blue Chip Stamps. In that opinion, he rebuked the majority for barring plaintiffs 
who did not actually purchase or sell securities from the private cause of action under § 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 and accused his fellow Justices of “exhibit[ing] a preternatural solicitousness of 
corporate well-being and a seeming callousness toward the investing public.” Blue Chip Stamps 
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975). 
 139.  Basic, 485 U.S. at 245.  
 140.  Id. at 255–56.  
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approval,141 and its discord with broader Congressional policy favoring 
disclosure.142 
The very same dispute underlies Halliburton II. However 
Petitioners in Halliburton II present the Court with a third option: 
upholding the presumption of reliance but replacing the efficiency 
predicate with an inquiry into actual price impact. Taking this position 
would perhaps mollify the equity-driven members of the Court, but it 
would also leave fundamentally unaltered the uneasy compromise 
that the Basic presumption represents. Nevertheless, it is the most 
likely result given the potentially disastrous consequences that 
abolishing Basic reliance might have on the viability of class actions 
for securities litigation. While the Court may be prepared to revisit 
the economic underpinnings of the fraud on the market rule, they are 
less likely unwilling to do so at the expense of the class action 
mechanism. 
 
 141.  Id. at 257. 
 142.  See id. at 259. Amgen’s evaluation of the congressional intent reads:  
[T]he federal securities laws are intended to put investors into a position from which 
they can help themselves by relying upon disclosures that others are obligated to make 
. . . If we say that a plaintiff may recover in some circumstances even though he did 
not read and rely on the defendants’ public disclosures, then no one need pay 
attention to those disclosures and the method employed by Congress to achieve the 
objective of the 1934 Act is defeated.  
Id. (quoting Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d. 462, 483 (5th Cir. 1981) (Randall, J., dissenting)). 
 
